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Introduction
Like all Western countries, the Netherlands has a sizeable minority of immigrants. Nowadays almost 10 percent of the Dutch population consists of non-Western (rst-or secondgeneration) immigrants, and this number is expected to increase to over 20 percent in the year 2050 (Netherlands Statistics, 2003) . In spite of the fact that immigrant households are a substantial and growing group within the total Dutch household population, they are usually under-sampled or neglected in general surveys. Insofar as they participate in a survey, members of those sub-populations are usually lumped together with the main population of Dutch descent. As a consequence, research on household labor supply decisions in the Netherlands tends to neglect the household labor supply decision process of these immigrants.
In this chapter we examine the time allocation decisions of Dutch, Turkish and Surinamese/Antillean households. By assuming endogenous labor supply for men and women and by considering housework and household production, we aim to contribute to a better understanding of the household decision process for the household types we distinguish.
Moreover, by making use of the collective household model, we are able to examine individual preferences and the intra-household bargaining process between the household members, so that dierences in ethnic background may reveal interesting dierences between Dutch and immigrant households.
The four largest immigrant groups in the Netherlands are from Turkey, Morocco, Surinam and the Dutch Antilles. During the 1950s, the Dutch decolonization process attracted immigrants from Indonesia. In the 1960s, inhabitants of Surinam and the Antilles received Dutch nationality, which gave them the right to work and live in the Netherlands (Cornelisse-Vermaat, 2005). In the 1960s and 1970s, when the Dutch economy ourished, Surinamese, Antillean, and Turkish workers came to the Netherlands to nd (low income) jobs. These immigrants were mostly men and although their initial intention was to stay in the Netherlands temporarily, they usually stayed permanently. Because we consider Surinamese/Antillean and Turkish households in this study, we shortly characterize these households.
The rst group originates from the former Dutch colonies of Surinam and the Dutch Antilles. Surinamese/Antillean households are well integrated in the Dutch society, their mother tongue is frequently Dutch and they received an education which resembles that of the Dutch. Some of them have been in the Netherlands for thirty years or more, while others immigrated rather recently, in the last decade. The Turkish minority is one of the largest minorities in the Netherlands. Most of them came from relatively backward regions in Turkey; they are Muslim, and frequently speak only Turkish within the family. Many 2 Dutch Turks have double nationality, and a large part of them choose marriage partners from their homeland, who immigrate under the Law of Family Reunion. Their education level is relatively low compared with the Dutch. The integration problems for both groups are reected by the high percentage of unemployed immigrants relative to the native Dutch (CBS, 2003; SCP , 2002) , the lower education levels of immigrants (SCP , 2003) , and, according to the (Dutch) Scientic Council for Government Policy (W RR), the lack of cohesion between immigrant groups and the native Dutch (WRR, 2001. This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present the theoretical framework. In Section 3 we present the parametric specication of the model and the estimation method.
In Section 4 we discuss the data and the estimation results are discussed in Section 5. In order to see how wage changes aect the time allocation choices of households, we derive the wage elasticities in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. The approach in this chapter is similar to that in Van Klaveren, van Praag, and Maassen van den Brink [2008] .
Theory
We consider a two-earner household where the preferences of spouse i (i = m, f ) are represented by the following direct utility function:
where U i (·) is twice continuously dierentiable and strictly concave. The individual utility functions depend on the household consumption, C, and the household production, H, and on the time that is spent on leisure (le i ), housework (wh i ) and paid work (jh i ). It is usually assumed that the working eort inuences utility negatively through a corresponding loss of leisure hours. However, many studies on life satisfaction nd that the experience of unemployment itself, rather than the loss of income through unemployment, reduces life satisfaction (Booth and van Ours, 2007) . A similar argument can be made for housework activities, and so men and women may derive positive or negative utility from the performance of housework.
Household expenditures on consumption goods are not observed in the data and, therefore, household consumption, C, is considered to be one Hicksian composite good, whose price is set to unity. The money value of this composite good is set equal to the total household income, Y . We have:
where w m and w f represent the wage rates of the spouses, and y stands for the net non-labor income of the household. Household production is generally not observed in data sets either.
We represent it by the household technology h(wh m , wh f ), that is a function of the hours that both spouses spend on housework, and we assume the following functional form:
where γ represents the marginal productivity of the woman relative to that of the man. With household production we mean the γ weighted sum of hours spent by both partners on what they call`household tasks'. These tasks include cooking, cleaning, doing the laundry, and other such activities. Of course, the distinction between housework and leisure may be ambiguous, and therefore we leave the empirical denition to the respondents themselves in the empirical analysis.
Because the aggregated level of household income (that represents consumption) and the weighted sum of the individual hours spent on housework each represent one value for each household, it follows that household consumption and household production are treated as if they are public goods in the household. However, this does not imply that commodities that are bought out of the household income cannot be consumed by one of the two spouses, e.g.
clothing, the barber, etc., but it does imply that, even then, a purchase by one of them needs the explicit or implicit approval of the other partner. It is an issue of bargaining between the two partners who in the end gets most of the pie. An immediate consequence of the public good assumption is, however, that it is not possible to examine how the various goods are distributed over the household members.
In the collective model, household decisions are assumed to be Pareto-ecient and under this assumption spouses behave as if an optimal bundle (le m , wh m , le f , wh f ) is chosen that maximizes the following household utility function: 1
subject to
where T is the total time endowment per week, and where job hours of spouse i is replaced by the individual time constraint T − le i − wh i . For identication purposes, each spouse's leisure is assumed to be a private good, i.e. the husband does not benet from the wife's leisure, and conversely (Chiappori and Ekeland, 2006) .
The individual utility functions are weighted by the utility weight function π(·) and this function usually depends on wages, non-labor income and on variables that do not enter the individual preferences directly but inuence the utility weight distribution. Hereafter, we refer to the latter as distribution factors, d. An intuitive interpretation of the utility weight is that it represents the division of bargaining power between the spouses. The higher the value of π(·), the more the utility function of household member m is weighted in the household utility function. An increase in π(·) can, therefore, be interpreted as an improvement of the bargaining position of the male.
It is important that π(·) depends on the individual wage rates, because otherwise the marginal compensated wage changes of the spouses would have the same eect on each other's labor supply by denition (this is usually referred to as the Slutsky symmetry condition). The model would then collapse into a neo-classical unitary model, where individual preferences are not considered and where the intra-household allocation of welfare cannot be studied. For an elaborate discussion on the consequences when π(·) is misspecied we refer to Browning et al. [2006] . We note that the restrictions of the unitary model are often empirically tested 
Let us focus on the rst partial derivative with respect to male leisure that consists of two terms. The rst term represents the male part of the collective utility function, while the second term represents the female part of the collective utility function. The leisure choice of the man inuences the household utility through the utility of the man and the utility of the woman. In order to see how this happens, we can write the rst F OC more extensively as:
The rst term between parenthesis on the right hand side ( ∂Um ∂lem ) indicates that the man's leisure inuences the household utility directly through the utility function of the male. This is the consequence of the identifying assumption that individual leisure is a private good.
Male leisure inuences the household utility through consumption Y and through the man's job hours, because we have replaced job hours by the individual time constraints. Because household consumption is considered as a public good, the household utility is inuenced, through the utility function of both the man and the woman, by the leisure time of the man.
As both utility functions are dierently weighted in the household utility function, the sum of the individual partial eects are weighted by the utility weight π as well.
We do not repeat this exercise for the other partial derivatives, because the intuition is the same. Assuming that households are in equilibrium, i.e., assuming that the household utility derivatives are equal to zero, and solving the partial derivatives for the choice variables leisure and housework (and consequently job hours) gives the following system of demand functions:
where we introduce the shorthand notation z that stands for the solution vector z = 6 (le m , wh m , le f , wh f ). These`time' demand functions are functions of the wage rates, the unearned income and the distribution factors that appear in the utility weight.
3 Parametric Specication and Estimation Method
Parametric Specication
According to the collective approach, household n's behavior may be viewed as the outcome of maximizing a household utility function of the following type:
where we assume for the moment that π is a constant variable. The preferences of household member i are described by a log-additive utility function:
Because 20 hours of housework may inuence utility dierently for a two-person family than it does for a family with two children, we assume that the eect that H has on utility varies with family size (f s), and include an interaction term between H and family size. Assuming that men and women choose an optimal time allocation bundle, we have the following partial derivatives:
When we focus on the rst two partial derivatives, it holds that the rst and the third term in each partial derivative refer to the partner's part of the collective utility function.
This part exists because the individual utility of both partners is inuenced through H by the partner's hours on housework and through Y by the partner's job hours. Given the chosen parametric specication the derivative ∂U h ∂lem becomes:
This derivative is a linear expression in the utility parameters (α m , α f ) = α of the man and the woman. The corresponding coecients are non-linear expressions in le m , le f , wh m , wh f , w m , w f , f s and y. The rst coecient, denoted by x 1,m,1 is , for example, 1 lem . Because α m,2 does not appear in the rst partial derivative we have x 1,m,2 = 0. We may write the rst partial derivative as:
The index 1 refers to the x−vector in the rst partial derivative. This x-vector is a 6-vector function x 1,m (le m , le f , wh m , wh f , w m , w f , f s, y). The other partial derivatives with respect to wh m , le f and wh f can be obtained in a similar manner and the system of partial derivatives can be written as
where X m and X f are (4 × 6)−matrices; and α stands for a 12-vector of utility parameters.
For household n we dene the (4 × 12)-matrix X n,h = π n X n,m (1 − π n )X n,f so that the expression in (11) can be written as:
Throughout this chapter we will use the short-hand notation z =(le m ,wh m ,le f ,wh f ). The system in (11) and (12) is the gradient of the household utility function U h (z) and we shall write it sometimes as the 4-vector U h (z) or, alternatively, as U z . This system describes the equilibrium if the gradient vector equals the zero vector. The (4 × 4)-matrix of second-order
Up until now, in this section, we have assumed that π is a constant variable. However, as is mentioned by Browning More formally, we assume that π n depends on characteristics v and dene it as:
where N (·) stands for the standard normal distribution function. This functional specication is convenient because the arguments can take any value on the real axis, while π is automatically constrained in [0,1]. We note that the normal distribution function is used without any probabilistic connotation. For convenience we have listed the wage characteristics in equation (13) separately from the other characteristics that may inuence the utility weight (represented by J j=3 β j · v j,n ). Consider the case where β 3 = ... = β J = 0, β 1 = −β 2 and w m = w f . We then nd that π(v) = 1 2 and this represents an equal division of bargaining power between men and women. In other words, the utility functions of men and women are equally weighted in the household utility function. The weight π(v) increases in the man's wage and decreases in the woman's wage. If β 3 = ... = β J = 0 and β 1 = β 2 , the weight is asymmetric, that is, even if w m = w f , we may have π(v) = 1 2 . Adding a constant, say β 0 , to the argument in N (·) would allow for the fact that one of the individual utility functions is structurally overweighted. However, when we included β 0 in the empirical model, it was always estimated as being insignicant and hence we dropped it from the model.
Estimation Method
From the partial derivatives in (12) it follows that household n is in equilibrium if :
where X n is a linear function in π n and α, and where the parameter vector (α, β) has to be estimated. 3 Normally, we would solve this system for the choice variables le m wh m , le f and wh f for each n, so that we obtain the optimal solution vector z * = (le * m , wh * m , le * f , wh * f ). By comparing z * n with the observed z n we can nd the optimal parameter estimates that would minimize the dierence between z * n and z n . However, this solution vector z * is highly nonlinear in the α and β parameters and so it is dicult to estimate the unknown parameters by a direct estimation method. We propose a more convenient indirect estimation method to estimate the unknown parameter vector (α, β) that is similar to the Wald-test criterion approach (see also Wales and Woodland, 1983 , Blundell and Robin, 1999 , Van Klaveren et al., 2008 . The estimation method is inspired by the fact that (14) is linear in the parameter vector α.
Because the matrix equality in (14) does not hold exactly, we add a stochastic component such that the estimation model becomes:
where y n is a nuisance vector with y n = 0 for all n, and where ε is a 4-dimensional error vector, which we assume to be ε ∼ N (0, Σ ε ). It is likely that time allocation choices of spouses are not correlated between households and so E(ε n , ε n ) = 0 if n = n . We do, however, allow the ε terms to be correlated within households, because such a correlation is probable.
The system in equation (15) can be estimated by an iterative two-step procedure. In the rst step we set β
(1) J = 1, yielding the rst round utility weight coecients π
(1) n . The superscript indicates the iteration round and we note that π (1) n varies with the household characteristics. Conditional on π (1) n , we can estimate the α-parameters by the method of Seemingly Unrelated Least Squares (SU R). Estimation of this system under the constraints α m = 1 and α f = 1 is equivalent to minimizing N 1 α X n Σ −1 ε X n α with 3 For notational convenience we write π n instead of π n (β; v n ) and leave out the subscript h. 10 respect to α under those constraints. By assuming, without loss of generality that α m = 1 and α f = 1, we exclude the`trivial' solution where all parameter estimates are 0. Because the utility functions can be interpreted as a net of indierence curves, the analysis is not aected by this normalization procedure.
In the second step we use the estimated α-parameters in the rst iteration round, denoted by α (1) , and estimate β 1,...,J by means of a non-linear maximum likelihood procedure. The estimated β-parameters in the second step are denoted by β (2) and we use them in the second iteration round to calculate π
(2) n . Conditional on π
(2) n , we re-estimate α (2) and with the estimated α (2) -parameters we re-estimate β (3) . These β's are then used in the third iteration round. We continue this iterative process until convergence is reached. However, for the respondent's partner we cannot use this denition because there is no information about the parental ethnicity of the partner. For the partner we, therefore, use a question that directly asks for the partner's ethnicity. The household is classied as Dutch, Surinamese/Antillean, or Turkish, if both the respondent and the partner have the same ethnicity.
In order to estimate the model, we need information on paid labor, leisure, and housework.
Although this information is available for the respondent, there is no information available on housework for the partner. The hours spent on housework by the partner are therefore imputed, conditional on individual and household characteristics. We denote the amount of housework of the respondent as wh r , and that of the partner as wh p . The time endowment ).
The inverse of (16) equals wh r = 168 1+e −θn,r and it is easy to check that wh n,r ∈[0,168] for any real number of θ n,r . 5 Using the auxiliary variable, we estimate the following equation by means of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS):
where s h n are household characteristics; and s r n are individual characteristics of the respondents for the N available households. The explanatory variables that we use are gender, the hourly wage rate, age, education level, the number of children between certain age levels, having a computer at home and the ethnicity of the household, using Dutch households as the reference group. The education variable represents the highest education level that is attained and it is measured on an eight-point scale, where one stands for primary school as highest education level and eight stands for having a university degree. The estimation results are shown in Table 2 .
From equation (16) it follows that a negative correlation between, for example, the male dummy and θ can be interpreted as a negative correlation between the male dummy and the hours spent on housework. As was to be expected, men spend less time on housework than women, and the presence of children increases the time that respondents devote to housework. The estimation results suggest that ethnicity is not correlated with the time devoted to housework, however the eect of household ethnicity is captured by the child variables.
By estimating equation (17) and obtainingδ 0 , ...,δ K , we can impute the missing values 5 If θ = 0, then wh r = 84; if θ → ∞ then wh r → 168; and if θ → -∞, then wh r → 0 wh n,p by calculatingθ n,p : θ n,p =δ 0 +δ 1 · s h n,1 + ... +δ j · s h n,k +δ k+1 · s p n,k + ... +δ n · s p n,K .
In equation (18) the respondent's characteristics are replaced by the characteristics of the partner whose housework hours wh p are not observed. Usingθ n,p and equation (16) we can obtain values forŵh n,p by inverting (16) as wh n,p = 168 1 + e −θn,p 
Estimation Results
We focus rst on the estimated preference parameters (α m , α f ) for Dutch, Surinamese/Antillean and Turkish households. The estimation results are displayed in Table 4 . The table also displays γ that represents the marginal productivity of the woman relative to that of the man, and the utility weight π, that represents how the individual utility functions are, on average, weighted in the household utility function.
Following the denition of household tasks, it is not assumed that household hours of male and female are perfect substitutes, i.e. γ = 1. If γ > 1, this means that the woman is marginally more productive in the household and if γ < 1 this means that the man is marginally more productive in the household. To asses γ, we let it vary with a width of 0.025, and choose the γ estimate that yields the highest log likelihood of the linear parameters. The relative marginal productivity is 0.98 for Dutch households, 0.8 for Turkish households, and 1.35 for Surinamese/Antillean. This means that the marginal housework hour of the Surinamese/Antillean woman is more valuable than that of her partner. The marginal housework hour of Dutch men is about equally productive than the marginal housework hour of Dutch women. The marginal housework hour of Turkish men is more productive than that of the Turkish women. Although γ may reect the ratio of productivity, it may also reect cultural backgrounds where dierent norms and values apply. It is well known that the roles of male co-workers in the household are very dierently interpreted in the three ethnic communities considered. Hence, we should be careful when making a productivity statement based on the value of the γ parameter. The model is, nevertheless, more exible by allowing for a rate of substitution that may be dierent from 1.
For Dutch men, the most important variables in their utility function are leisure and household income. For Dutch women, leisure seems to be the most important variable and to be done, but preferably not by themselves but by the partner. The importance of joint household production increases the larger the size of the family.
Leisure and household income are the most important variables in the utility function of Surinamese/Antillean Men. For these men, also joint household production interacted with family size is important, although this variable enters the utility function negatively. The estimation results for Dutch and Surinamese/Antillean men are rather similar, which is not that surprising, given the similarities in background characteristics (see Table 3 ).
Surinamese/Antillean and Dutch women appear to have dierent preferences, although leisure is important for both groups. While joint household production and household production interacted with family size signicantly enter the utility function of both Dutch and Surinamese/Antillean women, these variables are much more important for the latter group.
Turkish families appear to be dierent from Surinamese/Antillean and Dutch households.
The most important variable for Turkish men is leisure. Other, but less important variables, are household income and job hours. Household production and household production interacted with family size appear negatively in the utility function of Turkish men. For Turkish women, on the other hand, household production and household production interacted with family size is very important, just as leisure is important to these women. While leisure is important, the coecient of leisure is much smaller than the leisure coecient of Surinamese/Antillean and Dutch women. An explanation for the preference dierences between Turkish households and the other households that we distinguish is that these households are in general more traditional: men specialize on the labor market, and women specialize in household work.
In Table 4 , we report the average utility weight, π. When π is higher than 0.5, this means that the utility function of the male is more heavily weighted in the collective utility function. For Dutch households, π is slightly higher than 0.5, as is also the case for Turkish households. The latter result is interesting, because a more traditional household is usually associated with a situation where the bargaining position of the woman is relatively low.
However, our results indicate that Turkish households are the more traditional households, but we do not nd evidence that the bargaining position of women is relatively low. For Surinamese/Antillean households, we nd that the value is slightly below 0.5. This means that the relative bargaining position of the two spouses in Surinamese/Antillean households diers from that in Dutch and Turkish households. An explanation for this result may be that the divorce rate in Surinamese/Antillean families is relatively high, so that it is more important to maintain a higher degree of independence.
The distributions of π n for the three household types are shown in Figure 1 . The upper left graph shows the distribution of π n for Dutch households and we nd that it is approximately normally distributed around the mean of 0.55. For Surinamese/Antillean households (upper right graph) we nd that the power distribution is skewed to the left and so the median value of π n is smaller than the average value of π n . A t-test shows that π is signicantly smaller than 0.5 for Surinamese/Antillean households and this means that the utility weight that is assigned to the woman's utility function is frequently higher than the weight that is assigned to the man's utility function. For Turkish households (lower left graph) we nd very dierent values for π n , and that most values are above 0.5. A t-test indicates that π is signicantly higher than 0.5, which means that the utility function of Turkish men gets, on average, more weight in the collective household utility function. More generally, Figure   1 shows that there is substantial variation in the distribution of the utility weight between individual households. Table 5 shows the estimation results concerning the utility weight, where the utility weight depends on wage rates, the number of children between certain age levels and age. 6 For Dutch households we nd that age, the hourly wage rate, and the number of children aged between zero and three inuences the utility weight distribution. When partners are about the same age, the age eect will be small. However, if the age dierence increases, Note: */**/*** statistically signicant at the 10/5/1 percent level.
the utility weight distribution shifts to the advantage of the older partner, mostly men. The bargaining power of the woman increases when there are children present in the household aged between 0 and 3. The wage rate eects are as expected: the power distribution will shift in the direction of the partner whose hourly wage rate increases.
For Surinamese/Antillean households, the variation in the power distribution is entirely driven by the presence of children in the household. This is an interesting result. Apparently, the time allocation choices are not inuenced by the individual wage rates and so a wage increase inuences the time allocation choices of the partner only through the eect of the household income in the utility function and not through bargaining. Surinamese/Antillean women have more bargaining power if there are (more) children in the household and the bargaining eect is more pronounced when the children are younger. Similar to Dutch households, we nd a wage eect for Turkish households, although this eect is not as strong.
Also for Turkish households we nd that the presence of children increase the bargaining power of the woman and that this eect is more pronounced when the children are between zero and three years old.
Wage Eects
Time allocation choices depend on the wage rates of both partners, so it is interesting to examine how time allocation choices react to marginal wage changes. More formally, if the wage vector (w m ,w f ) = w changes by ∆w, we are interested in the change in z(w). Note that we use the short-hand notation z =(le m ,wh m ,le f ,wh f ). The wage eect matrix can be written as: 7
and consists of two parts. Part A, represents the usual gross substitution eect and part B represents the bargaining eect. From the identity jh + wh + le ≡ 24, it follows that the wage eects on job hours of the man and the woman are:
The corresponding elasticities, ∂z ∂w . w z , can be obtained using (20) . The elasticities are evaluated in the sample mean and are displayed in Table 6 .
For all three household types we nd a minor wage eect on the time that is allocated to leisure. It seems that men and women replace job hours for housework hours or vice versa. Men and women replace housework hours by paid labor if their hourly wage rate increases and that they do the opposite when the hourly wage rate of the partner increases.
The labor supply wage elasticities in this study are in line with those usually found for the Netherlands, although they are more pronounced. Evers et al. [2005] performed a metaanalysis and considered 239 wage elasticities from 32 empirical studies for dierent countries.
For the Netherlands, they found that the labor supply wage elasticities for men and women 7 In Appendix A we show how this wage eect matrix is constructed. 20 and this may explain why the wage elasticities are more pronounced in this study.
In Table 3 , we found that the values of the descriptive statistics associated with Surinamese/Antillean households were in between those of Dutch and Turkish households and in Table 6 . It is also in line with the observation that in young Dutch two-earner households both partners frequently have less than a full-time job. Policy makers often mention that increasing the labor supply of women is benecial because it generates extra benets through income taxes. However, usually they do not take into account the cross-elasticities. Thereby, they neglect the possibility that men in two-earner households, who generally pay higher marginal taxes than their partner, may supply less paid labor when the partner supplies more paid labor. As a consequence, the total benets for the government may be smaller than expected, or may even be negative. Government tax policy should thus take these cross-eects into account when they estimate the prospective tax benets of increasing female labor participation.
Conclusion
In this study, we examined the time allocation decisions of Dutch, Surinamese/Antillean and Turkish households. We assume that paid labor and housework are the endogenous choice variables and furthermore consider household production. By using the theoretical framework of the collective household model, we can examine individual preferences and the intra-household bargaining process between the household members.
We nd that leisure and household income are important utility variables for the household types we distinguish. Surinamese/Antillean and Turkish women dier from Dutch women because they value (joint) household production much more in their utility function.
Surinamese/Antillean and Turkish men, on the other hand, value joint household production less then Dutch men. Turkish households are the more traditional households, in the sense that the woman is more oriented on household production, while the man is oriented on paid labor.
It is often believed that the bargaining power of women in more traditional households is relatively low, but our estimation results do not support this idea. For Dutch and Turkish households, we nd that the man has slightly more bargaining power than his partner, and that the bargaining power varies in a similar way with individual and household characteristics. It increases with wage and the presence of young children increases the bargaining power of women. We conclude that the distribution of bargaining power within Turkish households is comparable with that of Dutch households, even though more traditional gender roles apply in Turkish household. For Surinamese/Antillean households we nd that the distribution of bargaining power within the household is entirely driven by the presence of children. The bargaining power of the woman increases when there are (more) children in the household. It follows that time allocation choices of Surinamese/Antillean men and women are only inuenced by the partner's wage through the household income and not through bargaining, because the individual bargaining position is not aected by the individual wage rates.
In general, the wage elasticities of Dutch, Turkish and Surinamese/Antillean households are comparable, although those for Turkish households are less pronounced. Because the wage elasticities with respect to leisure are close to zero, we nd that men and women replace housework hours by paid labor if their hourly wage rate increases and that they do the opposite when the hourly wage rate of the partner increases. The labor supply wage elasticities that we nd are comparable with those usually found for the Netherlands, although they are more pronounced.
The less pronounced wage elasticities of Turkish households may reect that these are the more traditional, however, at the same time we nd that the labor supply wage elasticity of Turkish women resembles that of Dutch women, and in that sense we cannot refer to the Turkish households as being more traditional. The wage elasticity with respect to housework for Surinamese/Antillean women is smaller than that for Dutch women. This dierence is the result of bargaining within Dutch households, and, at the same time, is the result of a preference dierence with respect to the joint household production.
Cross-elasticities are (almost) never reported and this is unfortunate because of its policy relevance. Based on our estimation results, and ignoring cross-elasticities, it is benecial to increase the labor supply of women, as long as the costs are lower than the extra benets that are recieved through income taxes. However, taking into account the cross-wage elasticities,
we nd that such an increase in the labor supply of women comes along with a decrease in the labor supply of men, who generally pay higher marginal taxes than their partner.
Government tax policy should thus take these cross-eects into account when they estimate the prospective tax benets of increasing female labor participation.
Appendix A
In this appendix we show how the wage eect matrix is constructed. Let us return to the system in (11) and assume that w (0) , z (0) represents the situation ex ante, and that w (1) , z (1)
is the new equilibrium. The (4 × 12)-matrix X is a function of w and by dierentiating the elements of the matrix X also with respect to w, we add two columns to the matrix U zz , producing the (4 × 6)-matrix (U zz U zw ). The matrix U zw is a (4 × 2)-matrix. Because ∂U h ∂z = π ∂Um ∂z + (1 − π) ∂U f ∂z = 0, we have to take into account that π depends on the wage vector as well:
where the last element is the product of a (1 × 2)-matrix and a (4 × 1)−matrix, resulting in a (4 × 2)-matrix. Denoting z (1) − z (0) = ∆z, the new equilibrium has to satisfy the equation:
U zz ∆z + U zw ∆w = 0.
The wage eect matrix is therefore:
